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Abstract 
 
In 2003 the Scottish Executive introduced a new  Fast Track policy on a pilot basis, 
which was intended to speed up the processing of persistent youth offending cases 
and reduce rates of persistent offending. Additional resources were provided to 
promote access to dedicated programmes, as well as quicker assessment, report 
delivery and decision-making. This paper, based on a multi-stranded comparative 
evaluation, describes how the policy was welcomed by a wide range of practitioners, 
decision-makers and managers involved with children’s hearings, most of thought it 
was a positive innovation consistent with the hearing system’s commitment to a 
welfare-based approach. Fast Track cases were handled more quickly than others. 
After two years, however, the policy was discontinued, largely because of negative 
evidence about re-offending.  
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Introduction  
 
In 2003 the Scottish Executive piloted a new  policy for dealing with persistent 
offending by young people that was widely welcomed by practitioners and managers 
at local level. The policy was called Fast Track Children’s Hearings, though the 
characterisation of the policy as ‘fast tracking’ only conveyed part of the story, since 
thorough assessment and guaranteed access to dedicated programmes were as integral 
to the policy as speed. The Executive provided additional resources to promote access 
to such programmes and to facilitate quicker assessment, report delivery and decision-
making. Two years later the policy was discontinued following a multi-stranded 
comparative evaluation. This article discusses the nature and findings of this research, 
with lessons not only for this particular policy but also for evidence-based policy 
more generally.  
 
Over the last 20 years support has grown for the idea that it is desirable to target youth 
justice interventions on young people whose offences are serious or persistent. Not 
only do they cause a disproportionate amount of harm to society and victims, but they 
are most at risk of becoming ‘life course’ offenders (Hagell and Newburn 1994; 
Smith 1995; Whyte 2006). However, there remain uncertainties and disagreement 
about how best to deal with minor or less persistent offenders, since there are well 
documented dangers of net-widening and up-tariffing, while early or pre-emptive 
intervention strategies aiming to nip youth crime careers in the bud are by definition 
directed at those who have not yet become heavily involved in offending, if at all 
(Muncie and Goldson 2006; Smith 2003). In Scotland young people who offend are 
not normally dealt with by courtsi, but by children’s hearings, which also handle ‘care 
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and protection’ and school non-attendance referrals (Lockyer and Stone 1998; Hill et 
al 2006). Hearings are conducted by three lay people (panel members) and referrals to 
the system are managed by children’s reporters. A survey carried out in the mid 1990s 
of panel members and professionals involved in the hearings system found that most 
thought it was generally effective, but did not work so well for young people who 
offend seriously or persistently (Hallett, et al. 1998). Also such young people are at 
high risk of graduating to adult court (Waterhouse, et al. 2000).  
 
The Scottish First Minister in 2003 expressed concern that the hearings were not 
coping well with young people who persistently offend, though as Whyte (2006) 
points out failing to deal effectively with this group is not the same as being unable to 
do so. Even so, concern that hearings were not dealing adequately with criminal and 
anti-social behaviour led the Scottish Executive to carry out a review of the 
Children’s hearings system over much the same period as the Fast Track pilot 
(Scottish Executive 2005). Also there was a wider policy focus on youth crime, with a 
managerial emphasis on targets and procedures (Audit Scotland 2002; Scottish 
Executive, 2002a and b) and new legislation targeting anti-social behaviour. McAra 
(2006) has argued that such recent policies have been in tension with both the 
welfare-oriented tradition of the hearings and its own social inclusion goals, resulting 
in ‘somewhat contradictory rationales’ (p. 127). 
 
A key component of the Youth Crime Strategy was to reduce persistent offending by 
10% in four years. In developing its policies, the Scottish Executive was aware of the 
substantial body of empirical evidence showing that certain kinds of programme with 
an emphasis on challenging attitudes and behaviour have been effective in reducing 
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rates of offending, though some inconsistency in the results has also been identified 
(Hollin 1995; McGuire and Priestley 1995; McNeill forthcoming; Utting and Vennard 
2000). A second key influence was an assumption that speeding up the processing of 
cases would also improve the impact of hearings. This follows a trend across Europe 
(van der Laan 2003).  
 
Hence the Executive decided to introduce a Fast Track approach to the children’s 
hearings system in early 2003 on a pilot basis in selected parts of Scotland. The aims 
were to: 
• reduce the time taken at each stage of decision-making  
• promote more comprehensive assessments including appraisals of offending risk 
• ensure that all young people who persistently offend and who require an 
appropriate programme have access to one 
• reduce re-offending rates as a result of the concerted efforts made in such cases. 
 
For the purpose of the pilot, persistent offending was defined to cover young people 
referred to the reporter on offence grounds on five or more occasions within 6 
months. It was also agreed that reporters could exercise discretion to include other 
young people under Fast Track (e.g. as a result of serious offences). 
 
Six local authorities were chosen for the pilot. Nearly £5 million was allocated to 
cover costs for preparing systems and services (2002-3) and the first year of 
implementation (2003-4). Over 90% of the allocation was given to the reporters 
Scottish Children’s Reporters Administration (SCRA) and local authorities to 
implement the policy. Small amounts went to enhance the training and infrastructure 
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for police and panel members. It is important to emphasise that this was additional 
funding on top of the sums received by all authorities for youth justice and children 
and families services. Thus it was not intended to cover the full costs of dealing with 
Fast Track cases. Existing fieldwork and residential resources, as well as education 
and health services, would still cover those cases.  
 
The evaluation and its aims 
 
The research was undertaken by staff at the Universities of Glasgow, Stirling 
and Strathclyde between February 2003 and January 2005 (Hill et al 2005). 
The Scottish Executive stipulated multiple aims for the research. These 
included assessing whether Fast Track hearings 
• processed  cases more quickly than conventional hearings 
• were better informed and led to better outcomes 
• were cost effective  
The primary concern of the Scottish Executive in commissioning the evaluation was 
to assess whether Fast Track ‘worked’ – in particular was it effective in reducing 
offending? A wider concern, recognised by the Executive, was that the new initiative 
might be seen by many participants in the children’s hearings system as deviating 
substantially (and negatively) from core principles of the hearings. In particular the 
hearings are based on the idea that all children should be treated in broadly similar 
ways regardless of the reason that they come to official attention and that the child’s 
interests should be the primary consideration, even if it is their behaviour that prompts 
the need for compulsory action (Lockyer and Stone 1998; Hill et al. 2006). Fast Track 
potentially breached this principle in two ways. Firstly it singled out a set of young 
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people to be dealt with differently from the majority of referrals. Secondly it required 
a programme focusing on the young person’s behaviour (though also giving 
consideration to her/his welfare). 
 
For some this could be seen as reinforcing a growing cleavage in how the hearings 
deal with care and protection cases and with youth crime. Although the decision-
making has remained integrated, the associated policies and services have become 
more separate in recent years, with the setting up of youth justice teams separate from 
children and families teams in local authorities and National Standards for Youth 
Justice services. New legal measures such as Anti-Social Behaviour Orders, Parenting 
Orders and Intensive Support and Monitoring Services (‘tagging’) have introduced 
what some have seen as a more punitive approach. This also appears to show more 
convergence towards the greater politicisation of youth justice policy in England and 
Wales, with a shift away from the ‘welfarism’ seen to characterise the Scottish 
approach (Bottoms and Dignan 2004; Pitts 2005; McAara 2006. However, Whyte 
(2006) notes that failing to help young people desist from crime is detrimental to their 
welfare, as well as that of the community, so there is not necessarily a contradiction 
between focusing on the attitudes and behaviour surrounding offences and a young 
person’s long term interests. 
 
Hence the research gathered not only data about the nature and effects of Fast Track, 
but also views on how far the new approach was seen as acceptable and compatible 
with the hearings’ principles. 
 
Research design and samples 
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The research had a comparative component, so that evidence about practice, service 
provision and outcomes in the Fast Track areas could be considered in the light of 
what was happening in areas outside the pilot. Similar data from the same kinds of 
sources were obtained from three comparison authorities whose total population was 
close to that of all the pilot authorities together. Individual authorities were not 
matched, but a review of relevant demographic and youth crime data showed that the 
two groups of pilot and comparison areas each had similar ranges of deprivation and 
offending characteristics. 
 
Information at the start of the study showed that the comparison areas together 
handled about 84% of the number of youth offending cases dealt with by the pilot 
sites in total. However, figures that became available later showed that there was an 
unexpected divergence in offence referrals to the reporter during 2002/3,  which 
increased by 42% in the pilot areas, but by only 8% in the comparison areas. This 
difference in trend would be important in interpreting the study findings later.  
 
The research used multiple methods and data sources to address its objectives. In the 
6 pilot and 3 comparison authorities interviews were conducted with reporters, social 
work managers, senior panel members, children’s hearings training organisers, police, 
sheriffs, sheriff clerks and reporter administrative staff. In most cases, interviews 
occurred twice or three times during the main fieldwork period (May 2003-July 
2004). A postal questionnaire survey was carried out of service providers in the nine 
authorities that worked with young people who persistently offend. 
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To obtain perspectives on individual cases, questionnaires were issued to reporters, 
panel members and social workers. Information from the reporters’ national database 
on the same cases was made available to the research team. Permission to send 
questionnaires and use the database was sought from young people and parents on the 
understanding that all the data would be treated confidentially. When an objection 
was registered, the case was not included. With these omissions, the remaining large 
majority of cases constituted the main sample for the study (223). There were 
markedly more cases from the pilot sites (167) than the comparison sites (56). This 
difference reflects in part the more general slowing down of offence referrals in the 
comparison areas relative to pilot areas noted above, but also small differences in the 
process for identifying persistent offender cases  on the database.  
 
To understand individual cases in more depth, largely qualitative interviews took 
place shortly after attending and observing a children’s hearing. Time constraints 
meant- that this part of the research was restricted to 10 cases.  
 
Sample sizes are shown below with respect to sources from which the research team 
gathered information directly: 
 
Table 1  Samples in the study 
 
Elements of the study Types of sample Sample size 
Key contact interviews in 
pilot sites 
Reporters, social work, police, 
panel chairs interviewed three 
times each; sheriffs and sheriff 
30 
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clerks once or twice 
Key contact interviews in 
comparison sites 
Reporters, social work, police, 
panel chairs interviewed twice 
12 
Reporter database data Cases from the pilot sites 167 
Reporter database data Cases from the comparison sites 56 
Interviews on database  Reporter administrative staff 6 
Case questionnaire survey Questionnaire returns by reporters 151 
Case questionnaire survey Questionnaire returns by social 
workers 
111 
Case questionnaire survey Questionnaire returns by panel 
members 
142 
Cost effectiveness data Cases on which standard 
information on service and costs 
inputs was obtained 
84 
Service provider survey Agencies in pilot and comparison 
areas providing services for young 
people who persistently offend 
58 
Intensive case study Cases where hearings were 
observed and participants 
interviewed 
10 
 
The following presentation of selected findings from the data concentrates firstly on 
views about the consistency or not of Fast Track with the integrated children’s 
hearings system, then with evidence about time-scales and effectiveness, the two key 
components of Fast Track. 
 10 
 
Key informant viewpoints on the relationship between Fast Track and 
fundamentals of the children’s hearings 
 
Information was gained in various ways on views about Fast Track and its 
compatability with perceptions of essential and desirable aspects of the children’s 
hearings system. Several questions on this matter were asked in interviews with key 
informants, including those in comparison authorities who did not have an interest in 
favour of Fast Track. Also open-ended questions related to this issue were included in 
questionnaires to reporters, panel members, social workers and service providers.  
 
With hardly any exceptions, key informants in both Fast Track and comparison areas 
did not see Fast Track as in tension with the fundamental principles of the children’s 
hearings system. Indeed many said that it was helping to put those principles into 
practice effectively. More than one person stated ‘This is how the hearings system 
should be’. In explaining this, they clarified that the main elements of Fast Track 
should be available to all children dealt with by the hearings (i.e. more thorough 
assessment, prompt response and guaranteed access to appropriate resources). Some 
accepted that it was right in the first instance to pilot this with one priority group ( 
young people who persistently offend), while others wanted it to be universalised. 
Only a small number, however, explicitly criticised Fast Track for potentially 
stigmatising young people. Also the interviews carried out with a small number of 
young people and parents indicated that they were not conscious of being labelled or 
treated differently, except that their case was being considered more quickly than 
usual. 
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Most respondents highlighted additional and more varied resources as the most 
critical benefit of Fast Track compared with ‘normal’ hearings cases: 
 
Guarantee of provision of services… in the normal system there is no 
guarantee of services. (Panel chair) 
 
 (The quality of services) has improved, definitely. Also the use of services has 
been more imaginative, especially with the use of mentors and outreach 
workers. (Police) 
 
We can get the reports on time, we can make our decisions within the 
timescales, we get a higher quality of reports, we get an adequate assessment 
of the young person, young people are now prioritised. (Reporter) 
 
The main affects (of Fast Track)…are that we can now access resources that 
we could not access before…(leading to) a more positive approach… (we are) 
more confident that care plans can be implemented, that resources (for the 
care plan) will be there. (Social work) 
 
Most respondents also believed that the additional money given to agencies in Fast 
Track areas was associated with an improvement in the service. One panel chair 
reported that the feedback sheets routinely completed by panel members on each case 
‘are on the whole incredibly positive.. they see results’. 
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Some people suggested that the better quality of work in Fast Track was being 
reproduced when dealing with other kinds of case (or might generalise given time). A 
further indirect benefit, observed particularly by social work managers, was that better 
resourcing of youth justice and specialist Fast Track teams led to a reduction of work 
load in existing children’s and families teams, freeing up their ability to work on 
family issues more readily. A panel chair also commented favourably about a knock 
on effect for social work in non-Fast Track cases: 
 
 Fast Track has taken the pressure off other services, and has allowed them to 
focus on more day to day services…..there has been a freeing up of resources. 
 
Asked if Fast Track would give rise to difficulties in balancing responses to a child’s 
needs and deeds, most key contacts felt that no problems resulted, provided that all 
the elements of Fast Track worked effectively. Several valued the redressing of the 
balance to give more priority to addressing behaviour, supporting the Executive view 
that this was a desirable change in orientation. The emphasis on a prompt response 
was thought to motivate young people to change: 
 
I think it reinforces to children concerned the relation between cause and 
effect…() this brings home the link between the hearing and what they have 
done. (Panel chair) 
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Drawbacks to Fast Track were identified, though many of these related to its initial 
operationalisation, including some issues such as lack of clarity about exiting the Fast 
Track that were sorted out during the course of the evaluation. Panel chairs were all 
conscious of a significant increase in their own workloads (e.g. in relation to training, 
advice, attending meetings, assisting with the research). The workload implications 
for reporters seemed more variable. In areas with few Fast Track cases, the impact on 
their work demands was not thought to be great, but elsewhere they were more 
conscious of the extra requirements: 
 
One of the things is that reporters are working so hard that they do not have 
time to think…reflection time is squeezed out. I think there is a huge risk that we 
become process driven and lose sight of being child centred. (Reporter) 
 
This last comment illustrates a wish expressed by certain others too that 
‘managerialism’ as well as the focus on offending should not override concerns with 
young people’s needs. 
 
Survey data on opinions about Fast Track 
 
In the questionnaires filled in by panel members during the later stages of the research 
they were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with a number of 
statements about Fast Track, based on their general experience of the pilot. The 
results are summarised in Table 2. There was fairly widespread agreement that Fast 
Track had resulted in quicker decision making and an enhanced focus on offending 
behaviour. At the same time, a big majority of the panel members believed  that Fast 
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Track has not adversely affected attention to young people’s needs and very few 
thought it applied unhelpful labels to young people. The point about which panel 
members were most divided or unsure was whether Fast Track had produced readier 
access to resources as intended. 
 
Table 2: Panel members views on changes after Fast Track  
 
 Agree Disagree Unsure 
Quicker decision making 
 
31 4 4 
More focus on offending 
behaviour 
29 6 4 
Quicker access to resources 23 9 9 
Additional resources available 12 10 11 
Reduced focus on young 
person’s needs 
6 29 4 
Attachment of unhelpful label to 
young person 
3 30 7 
[N=41] 
 
Some suggested that, aside from the speedier timescales and additional resources, Fast 
Track was in practice little different from traditional hearings: 
 
 Great to see referrals coming quicker. I do not regard or treat Fast Track 
differently.  (Panel member) 
 15 
 
 I don’t think there is much difference between Fast Track and normal 
hearings apart from additional resources. I think that all hearings should 
be fast-tracked, not just offenders. (Panel member) 
 
Some panel members suggested that the resources provided for Fast Track should be 
made more widely available in order that the benefits were not restricted to young 
people who persistently offend 
 
Besides seeking general opinions about Fast Track the questionnaires asked about the 
application to a particular case. Nearly all the panel members stated that action plans 
in Fast Track cases were adequate, appropriate or very appropriate. As one panel 
member explained “it seemed to be flexible and thorough enough to meet the needs”. 
In most cases panel members believed that the plan paid sufficient attention to both 
offending issues and welfare issues. Interestingly the minority who identified an 
imbalance were more concerned about a neglect of the young person’s deeds rather 
than needs. In all a fifth of panel members thought that offending behaviour was 
insufficiently addressed in the case under consideration:  
 
 There is little specific action on offending and more focussed on ‘child 
minding’, leisure activities, filling child’s day. (Panel member) 
 
 Details of how offending behaviour was to be addressed could have been 
clearly identified.  (Panel member) 
 
 16 
The reporter questionnaires also asked for case specific information about attention to 
the offence and other matters at the hearing. In the Fast Track areas (N=69) over four 
fifths of responses indicated that an appropriate amount of attention had been given to 
both the offence and family matters, with three quarters stating that coverage of 
school was about right too. This supports the views of panel members that Fast Track 
was paying due regard to the offence, but not at the expense of ‘welfare’ issues.  
Furthermore, the reporters considered that in the vast majority of instances these 
issues were discussed no differently whether or not the case was part of Fast Track. 
 
Similarly, reporters commenting on the Fast Track cases were mainly positive about 
the effectiveness of services in improving aspects of the young person’s life other 
than offending. They felt services were fully effective in one-fifth of cases and partly 
effective in two-thirds of cases (N=77). In the comparison authorities, reporters 
considered that services were fully effective in only one in ten cases but partly 
effective in a similar proportion of cases as in the pilot authorities (N=17). 
. 
Most social workers who completed questionnaires  indicated that the amount and 
type of services available under Fast Track were good. Though a few mentioned 
continuing shortages (e.g. mental health services), several noted an improvement in 
availability:  
 
(The voluntary agency) has  provided services to stabilise the level of offending 
and it has dropped…(these services) helped by taking him out and engaging in 
activities as diversions.’ (Social worker) 
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The version of the questionnaire for service providers sent to those in the pilot 
authorities included questions asking for their opinions on the advantages and 
disadvantages of Fast Track and its impact on their work. The main gains emphasised 
were the shorter time between offences and the hearing, enlarged capacity to provide 
and combine services, sometimes on an inter-disciplinary basis, and the way this 
enabled focussed intervention.  
 
 The speed of system: consistent assessment model; targeting of services to 
identified need’. (Service provider) 
 
 Addresses serious behaviour in a timescale that is meaningful to the child. 
Better focus on coordination of services and responses.’ (Service provider) 
  
The majority of service provider respondents expressed support for Fast Track but a 
number argued that Fast Track risked diverting resources away from other important 
needs of young people or detracted from a holistic welfare orientation to young 
people.  
Has altered the agenda/value of service negatively: too little emphasis on 
welfare care and protection. Highlights offending disproportionately. 
(Service provider) 
 
The potential for stigma was also noted by some service providers.  
Can label young people. Does not take holistic approach  (Service provider) 
 18 
 
 
Characteristics of Fast Track cases 
 
To make sense of the evidence about the impact of Fast Track, it is necessary to 
review briefly the nature of the cases covered by the new policy. During the first 18 
months of the pilot, 307 children ‘entered’ Fast Track. Young people could ‘exit’ if 
work was deemed to have been completed successfully or conversely if no progress 
was made. Also a young person could exit on reaching adulthood. By the end of the 
first 18 months, 76 young people had ‘exited’, leaving three quarters (231) still 
involved. The most common durations were between 7 and 13 months. 
 
Most young people in Fast Track were in their mid-teens. 85% were boys and 15% 
were girls, which corresponds with the wider gender distribution of young people 
reported for offending (Moffit and Caspi 2001; SCRA 2002).  
 
On average the number of offences committed over the period February 2003 to July 
2004 by young people in Fast Track was 18.2 compared with 2.4 for other young 
people referred on offence grounds (SCRA Update 2005). The main types of offences 
committed were broadly similar to the patterns for offences by young people as a 
whole, i.e. breach of the peace (20%), assault (18%) and vandalism (16%).  
 
It might be expected that young people who persistently offend require some form of 
compulsory intervention. In Scotland this normally consists of a supervision 
requirement by a children’s hearing, which may apply to a young person living at 
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home or direct that s/he live in residential or foster care. Just over half of the main 
sample were already on supervision when they entered Fast Track. About a third of 
them had ceased to be on supervision after 18 months, but a slightly larger number 
had begun supervision in the mean time. This meant that overall about one in five of 
young people did not experience supervision at all while in Fast Track. 
 
Views on the effectiveness of Fast Track 
 
While general feedback about Fast Track by participants was largely favourable, 
comments on individual cases showed more mixed perceptions of its effectiveness. 
Reporters, panel members and social workers were asked on questionnaires to 
comment on how effective the interventions had been in meeting objectives for the 
case under consideration. Many reporters were guarded in their ratings, with about 
half opting for a description of ‘partly effective’ (49%), nearly a third for fully 
effective (32%) and the rest doubting any positive impact. This was very similar to 
the pattern of responses in comparison areas, where reporters considered that services 
were fully effective in one quarter of cases (26%) and partly effective in just under 
three-fifths of cases (58%).  
 
Social workers in both types of area were asked about the reasons for improvement (if 
this had occurred) and collectively provided a wide-ranging list of issues, which 
suggests that there was no single or simple answer to the young person’s needs and 
deeds. For a number of young people, progress was not attributed to any service, but 
to significant life changes, such as a partner’s pregnancy or obtaining employment. 
Fast Track social workers specified the following services as ones they thought had 
been most effective in reducing offending as follows: 
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• offending specific work (28%) 
• changes in care placement or the support of carers (20%) 
• generally supportive relationships with workers in projects (15%);  
• a good experience in school or work (12%);  
• drug related work (10%).  
 
Responses from comparison sites identified a similar range of services as particularly 
effective.  
 
Outcomes with respect to time-scales 
 
The case studies indicated that parents and young people had limited understanding of 
Fast Track, but did tend to see the quicker process as its key element, not the services. 
The Government had set Standards for Fast Track to achieve quicker processes than 
hitherto (Audit Scotland 2002) at three stages: 
1. From police charge until the reporter receives the police report 
2. From receipt of the police notification until the reporter decides on the 
response 
3. If the reporter decides to call a hearing, from reporter decision to hearing 
 
In other parts of Scotland including the comparison sites national standards with 
longer time-scales applied. The details are shown in Table 3:  
 
Table 3: Target time-scales for Fast Track and comparison sites (in working days) 
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Stage Fast Track Comparison 
Delivery of police reports 10  
(for all cases) 
10  
(for 80 % cases) 
Reporter decisions 28 50 
Preparing for hearing 15 20 
 
Data provided by SCRA and the police forces showed that the percentage of police 
reports delivered within 10 days increased markedly in all the forces covering Fast 
Track areas, much less so in other forces. For the most part, reporters met the target of 
making decisions within 28 days, since the mean figure for all cases where a decision 
had been reached was 27 days. In all the comparison sites it typically took much 
longer and in two of them the mean time taken was over 50 working days. Similarly 
the Initial Assessment and Social Background Reports provided by local authority 
social workers to reporters had an average submission rate in the Fast Track areas 
(49% to 100% within 20 days) that was much quicker than in comparison authorities 
(20% to 48%).   
 
The national standard in all hearings cases for the gap between a reporter decision and 
a hearing is 20 working days, while the Fast Track target was 15 working days. Three 
of the pilot authorities achieved the Fast Track target for persistent offending cases, as 
did one of the comparison authorities. The other three pilot authorities had averages of 
16 or 17 days, while the other two comparison sites averaged 19 and 22 days.  
 
Overall it may be concluded that at each stage, agencies in Fast Track areas processed 
cases more quickly on average (a) than they had previously and (b) than occurred in 
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comparison areas, though in a small minority of cases targets were not met. This in 
itself meant there was a shorter period of opportunity for re-offending, while the 
comparatively quick response could have deterrent effects. However, at both central 
and local government levels it was recognised that specialist assessment and services 
were also required to modify the offending, so we now consider the impact of Fast 
Track on these.  
 
Assessment and care plans 
 
In the Fast Track cases, use of a standard risk assessment form was almost universally 
achieved, as either YLS (Hoge and Andrews 2001; Hoge 2002) or ASSET (Burnett 
and Roberts 2004) was used in 95% of cases. The application of these was much less 
in comparison sites (one third of cases).  
 
Most panel chair and reporter key contacts said that, since the introduction of the Fast 
Track system, social work reports had typically become more comprehensive, timely, 
and focused, compared with previously or with current non-Fast Track cases. 
Likewise, three-quarters of reporters’ case questionnaire responses  in the Fast Track 
areas indicated improvement in the quality of social work assessment. This was not 
matched in the comparison areas, where only one in six reported an improvement. 
Similarly more panel members rated social work assessments and action plans as 
good in Fast Track cases than comparison cases.  
 
Access to services 
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Key contacts in pilot areas reported that insufficient time had been allowed to set up 
some of the new services by the time Fast Track started. However, once these initial 
problems were overcome, most respondents believed that Fast Track ensured ready 
availability of appropriate services, e.g. 
 
Basically we have more resources for young offenders at our fingertips (now). 
We have health specialists, outreach support, psychiatric and psychological 
health support… (Social work manager) 
 
Information on service inputs to a sample of individual Fast Track cases showed that 
most often between 3 and 8 hours of community-based support was provided per 
week, of which typically between 1 and 3 hours was provided by the main social 
worker/youth justice worker. The usage of voluntary sector services ranged from three 
quarters of cases in one authority to under one fifth in two others. There was also 
considerable variation in the use of mentors, social work assistants, youth support 
workers and through care staff. Data from comparison sites suggested that the range 
of time input of community based services was similar, but use of voluntary agencies 
occurred in fewer cases. Also only half as many attended standard, offence-related 
programmes (20% against 40%). 
 
Although only a minority of young people who persistently offend were in residential 
care, the cost of this is so much higher than for community based services that this 
accounted for well over half the expenditure on individuals in Fast Track. Cost data 
were not available for education and health services, but the cost of social work 
community based services was under £200 per week in three quarters of cases, 
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whereas all those in residential care cost at least £1000 per week and for one third the 
cost was over £3,000 per week. 
 
Figures for the mean expenditure on young people who persistently offend showed 
that the spending in comparison sites was rather higher on average than in Fast Track 
sites, presumably in part because the absence of additional funds was offset by the 
considerably lower numbers. For those living in the community, the mean expenditure 
in comparison sites was just over £9,000 for the 12 months after the case was flagged 
for persistent offending. This compared with just over £8,000 in Fast Track areas. The 
equivalent figures for young people accommodated residentially were £96,000 in 
comparison sites and £87,000 in pilot sites. 
 
Offending behaviour outcomes  
 
Thus far the evidence has suggested that young people in Fast Track were normally 
dealt with more quickly, given a standard risk assessment and had a more thorough 
report written about them. They were more likely to access an ‘appropriate’ 
intervention, though the evidence also suggested that service provision over all was 
not that different between Fast Track and comparison areas. The expectation was that 
this improvement in processing and services would result in reduced offending.  
 
Within the time-frame of the evaluation it was only possible to examine follow-up 
offending data for 6 months after young people entered Fast Track or met the 
equivalent criteria in the comparison areas. The Scottish Executive intention was (and 
is) to track offending outcomes for a longer period after the evaluation. 
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It was not feasible for the study to obtain self-report data about offending, so reliance 
had to be placed on official records of young people’s offending. Evidence from 
reporters for all 228 young people who were in Fast Track during the first 12 months 
showed that the number of offences committed by this population in the 6 months 
immediately after entry to Fast Track had reduced by over 500 (23%), compared with 
the 6 months before entry (SCRA 2005). 11% were not referred at all in the 6-month 
after period and a further 29% were referred only once or twice. 
 
Thus the young people in Fast Track were to some extent desisting, but it was 
important to contrast this result with that for the comparison areas. It was not possible 
to match the individuals or allow for differences in prior interventions that may have 
affected outcomes, so it could not be firmly concluded that any differences in 
outcome were due to the differences in treatment and services. Nevertheless the case 
questionnaire and SCRA data suggested that both Fast Track and comparison samples 
included similar ranges as regards previous offence referral patterns, broad age 
patterns, gender balance and living situation, so that broadly similar outcomes might 
be expected.  
 
For the comparison of the two study samples, information was obtained from the 
police about charges of young people aged 16+ years, which were added to the pre-16 
referrals to reporters. These combined data showed that in both types of area a clear 
majority of young people had reduced their offending after being identified as 
persistently offending according to the Fast Track criterion. However the proportion 
with a decrease in the number of offences was higher in the comparison sites (81% as 
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opposed to 69%). Likewise, the mean number of offences per young person declined 
in both areas, but to a larger degree in the comparison sites. In the Fast Track areas 
the mean number of offences committed fell from 9.1 to 7.5 (N=167), whereas in the 
comparison sites the fall was from 10.7 to 5 (N=56). In individual pilot authorities, 
the proportion of young people reducing offending ranged from 50% to 82%. In 
comparison authorities, the range was from 70%-91%. Further analysis of a larger 
sample over a longer period confirmed this pattern:  reductions in offending by young 
people who persistently offend was smaller in the Fast Track than comparison areas.  
 
A cost effectiveness exercise suggested  that the quicker time for processing cases in 
Fast Track areas, combined with the reduction in post-implementation offending, 
resulted in a potential saving of approximately £350 per case, compared with 
comparison sites. However, the greater official crime reductions in the comparison 
sites represented a much greater saving (£20,000 per case in contrast to £4,000 per 
case in the Fast Track areas). 
 
The evaluation team recognised limitations in the evidence about offending trends. 
Virtually all research on offending rates for individuals has to rely on proxy indicators 
such as arrests or charges (e.g. Cottle et al 2001), as it is not possible to observe and 
record the criminal activities of large numbers of young people. Self-report data is 
clearly affected by honesty and response rates, but is probably the best approximation. 
The present study was not resourced to obtain such information.  
 
Data on offending recorded by the police and those with a ‘prosecutorial’ role (in this 
instance, reporters) is affected not only by ‘real’ levels of activity, but also by the 
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relative success of detection and discretion about which incidents are reported and 
included as matters warranting a charge (Farrington 1992; Lloyd et al 1994; van der 
Laan and Smit 2006). In this study, a number of informants pointed out that a 
considerable number of offence referrals arose from incidents committed in 
residential care. In that context, the same event (e.g. a fracas or theft) may or may not 
be reported or dealt with by the police as a crime depending on the specific context. 
There appear to be considerable variations in practice (Bradshaw 2004), though there 
was no reason to think that the Fast Track areas, spread as they were across Central 
Scotland, should systematically differ from others. A separate point made was that 
two of the forces covering a Fast Track area adopted stringent policies towards youth 
crime, which resulted in more charges than previously and elsewhere. However, all 
the comparison areas had better offending figures than all the Fast Track areas, so it 
might be thought unlikely that the research happened by chance to select comparison 
areas all of which had a different policing approach to the Fast Track sites.  
 
The period for examining offence trends was also relatively short in this study. Most 
research that examines post-intervention offending trends considers one or two year 
periods, while arguably the eventual  extent of criminality in adulthood is a crucial 
outcome measure (Burnett and Roberts 2004). 
 
Thus it remains possible that the offence data did not accurately represent trends in 
actual behaviour. If the findings do reflect reality, though, then the comparison areas 
appear to have had more  effective policies and services. As the approaches in each of 
the three areas were quite different, it is hard to generalise. Nevertheless the 
qualitative data obtained in the study produced a number of possible explanations for 
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greater success in the comparison areas, including an emphasis on early intervention, 
the cumulative benefits of falling numbers of ‘difficult’ cases allowing more to be 
spent per case and perhaps a better balance of spending time on direct work as 
opposed to assessment and report writing. 
 
Conclusions and implications 
 
The key elements of Fast Track were supported by most of the practitioners and 
decision-makers in the pilot areas. Nearly all thought that the focus on prompt 
targeted action towards young people who persistently offend was consistent with the 
hearings system’s priority towards the child’s best interests. In most cases, 
improvements in assessment, planning and access to resources were reported. The 
study showed that Fast Track had been successful in speeding up the procedures for 
dealing with offences at each stage.  
 
However, the Scottish Executive regarded the data on offending, despite its 
limitations, as conclusive. This suggested that the additional resources had not 
produced the desired reductions compared with elsewhere in Scotland, so Fast Track 
was not rolled out nationally as had been intended. Instead the Executive decided to 
concentrate on seeking improvements in decision-making and services by means of 
National Standards. Interestingly at about the same time, the review of the Children’s 
Hearings which had been prompted by critical comments, produced a largely positive 
report committed to the centrality of the child’s welfare, while also recognising the 
need for changes. One proposed alteration that is particularly relevant here is to have 
a single ground of referral to the children’s hearings, namely a need for compulsory 
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measures (Scottish Executive 2005). On the face of it, this would reinforce the 
welfare basis of the system as a crime would no longer be a separate ground of 
referral, though doubtless records would continue to distinguish offence cases in some 
way. Thus the Scottish approach to youth crime continues both to be influenced by 
the wider politicisation apparent across the UK and to retain the essential features that 
have made it distinctively welfare-oriented since 1971 (Whyte 2006). 
 
It is not often that policy initiatives in the UK are discontinued on the basis of adverse 
evidence. Reliance on statistical and quasi-experimental evidence as the sole or main 
basis for policy decisions has been questioned elsewhere  (Hill 1999; Trinder and 
Reynolds 2000). The present study highlighted the need for evidence from official 
sources to be accompanied by detailed intelligence about how that data has been 
generated, especially given the well-known recognition that statistics are socially 
produced from the often varying practices of front-line workers that affect both 
responses to and records of incidents. The evaluation also showed how it can be hard 
to assess and interpret changes in large complex interacting systems. The multiple 
nature of the data types and sources sought to overcome this to some extent, but at the 
end of the day it was mainly one criterion (figures on re-offending) that was deemed 
by the policy makers to be critical in their decision not to proceed. It would have been 
inconsistent with the Executive’s commitment to evidence-based policy and best 
value to continue to devote substantial resources to this high profile initiative, when 
statistics (albeit possibly an inaccurate representation of offending trends) suggested 
that the main objective in tackling youth crime was not being fulfilled. 
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Since the evaluation was intended to assess Fast Track, the research team had to 
devote much of its energies to gathering information from those areas. Although 
information was gathered, mostly second hand, about service and policy 
developments in the comparison sites, this was not specific enough to identify why 
they had a particularly good record, apparently. It is important for future comparative 
evaluation to assess the so-called ‘normal’ services equally along with the ‘special’ 
intervention and its own interaction with existing interventions and local policies. 
 
Above all the study demonstrated the complexity of evaluating the impact of multiple 
systems across broad areas. A range of evidence from many sources was deployed to 
provide an account of how Fast Track worked and what its effects were, but in the end 
the conclusions remain suggestive rather than conclusive. If the evidence had shown 
that Fast Track did impact positively on offending as well as time-scales and morale, 
it is quite possible that the reasons for its success would be even more opaque, as the 
design and outcomes would have been subject to less close scrutiny. Herein lies 
perhaps a warning against overgeneralisation and oversimplification of lessons from 
research and official data. It is vital to take a wide range of evidence into account in 
policy-making, but the implications are rarely simple and straightforward. 
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i
 Except for very serious offences. Also any denial of guilt is dealt with by the Sheriff Court, returning 
to a children’s hearing for a decision if the charge is proven. 
